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ABSTRACT 
A conceptual framework that depicts soma of the private and public 
costs and benefits of irrigated agriculture is presented for use 
in identifying situations in which public policies might be 
implemented to generate a socially optimal use of resources in a 
competitive equilibrium. The framework is useful in describing 
the potential social gains or losses due to policies that motivate 
farmers to internalize the external costs or benefits of their 
activities. The model is demonstrated using the example of water 
quality issues pertaining to irrigation and drainage in 
California's San Joaquin Valley. The potential social costs of 
public policies designed to reduce the volume of subsurface drain 
water and selenium loads discharged into the San Joaquin River are 
examined using the conceptual framework. 
INTRODUCTION 
In many areas of the world, irrigated agriculture generates both 
private and public costs and benefits. Farmers have an economic 
incentive to maximize private net benefits, which are the returns 
they receive in excess of production costs. In competitive 
markets, private net benefits will be the same as public net 
benefits, provided that all costs and benefits are internalized in 
farm-level decisions. When some costs or benefits are external to 
farm-level deciSions, the social optimum will not be achieved in a 
competitive equilibrium. In those cases, public policies may be 
required to motivate farmers to consider pertinent external costs 
or benefits. 
Public policies must be chosen carefully to motivate the desired 
changes in farm-level decisions, without causing undesirable 
distortions in resource use or in the set of crops produced. 
Accurate information regarding external costs and benefits will 
assist public officials in identifying situations where public 
policies are required to generate a socially optimal use of 
resources, and in selecting appropriate policy instruments and 
parameter values. Useful information includes a conceptual 
framework that describes the nature of pertinent external costs 
and benefits, and empirical estimates of those costs and benefits. 
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The goal of this paper is to present a conceptual framework for evaluating the external costs and benefits of irrigated agriculture, for use in examining public policies that may be implemented to generate a socially optimal use of resources in a competitive equilibrium. The framework is useful in describing the potential social gains or losses due to policies that motivate farmers to internalize the external costs or benefits of their activities. The model is demonstrated using the example of water quality issues pertaining to irrigation and drainage in 
California's San Joaquin Valley. The potential social costs of public policies designed to reduce the volume of subsurface drain water and selenium loads discharged into the San Joaquin River are examined using the conceptual framework. 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
In general, the private (farm-level) costs and benefits of irrigated agriculture are described by the prices paid and received by farmers in input and output markets. Market demand curves for farm products generate derived demand curves for farm inputs that describe the incremental values generated by employing additional units of inputs. For example, the farm-level incremental values of irrigation water are determined by the market value of the incremental output generated by delivering additional water. Farmers determine the profit-maximizing amount of water, per unit of land area, by comparing their expectation of incremental benefits with incremental costs. The farm-level incremental cost of irrigation water is constant when farmers face a flat-rate pricing structure. 
It is easiest to describe the incremental costs and benefits of one variable input, such as irrigation water, while assuming that the use of other inputs is constant. A graph depicting the typical conceptual relationship between the incremental costs and benefits of irrigation water is presented in Figure 1. The farm-level profit-maximizing choice is denoted as WF, where incremental cost is equal to the incremental benefit. 
The farm-level value of a fixed input, such as land, is determined by summing the discounted present value of net returns that can be generated by keeping the input in production during an appropriate time horizon. For example, farmers expecting to earn S600 ha-l in net returns from cotton production, in perpetuity, should be willing to pay any price up to SlO,OOO ha-l for land if their discount rate is 6 percent. The incremental value of land may decline with farm size for an individual farmer if other 
resources, such as capital or management, are in limited supply. Variation in land quality will cause the aggregate incremental value curve to be downward sloping, as farmers employ the best land first, before extending production to lower quality land. 
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A graph depicting the typical conceptual relationship between the 
incremental costs and benefits of land in production is presented 
in Figure 2. The farm-level profit-maximizing choice is denoted 
as LF' where incremental cost is equal to the incremental benefit. 
The incremental cost curve is shown as upward-sloping in this 
example to denote the situation in which land of a given quality 
is limited in supply. In such cases, farmers desiring additional 
land will face an upward-sloping supply curve. The incremental 
benefit curve is downward sloping to reflect diminishing returns 
to additional land, caused by declining land quality or by capital 
and management constraints. 
In competitive markets in which producers and consumers have full 
information regarding prices and quantities, farm-level choices 
regarding fixed and variable inputs will be socially optimal, if 
all pertinent costs and benefits are included in the curves 
depicted in Figures 1 and 2. Farm-level decisions will not be 
socially optimal when input use or resource allocation decisions 
generate external costs or benefits that increase or reduce 
measures of social welfare, while not affecting farm-level net 
returns. Classic examples of agricultural externalities include 
the use of fertilizer and pesticides that degrade water quality in 
streams or aquifers receiving surface runoff from farm fields. 
In arid regions, the volume of irrigation water delivered to farm 
fields must exceed crop water requirements to maintain salt 
balance. The excess water contributes to surface runoff and deep 
percolation that enter regional drains or shallow water tables. 
Agricultural drainage water containing salts, boron, or other 
elements may degrade water quality in receiving streams and 
aquifers. When this occurs, farm-level decisions regarding water 
use per unit of land area may not be socially optimal. Figure 3 
depicts a situation in which the social incremental costs of 
irrigation lie above the private incremental costs. The vertical 
distance between the two curves, at any point, denotes the 
external incremental cost at that volume of water per hectare. 
When irrigation generates external costs, the socially optimal 
water volume, Ws , will be less than the farm-level profit-
maximizing volume, WF ' In those cases, public policies that 
increase the farm-level cost of water may be appropriate to 
motivate farmers to reduce water use from WF to WS' 
The external effects of land in agricultural production are often 
considered to be positive, rather than negative (Hodge, 1991). 
For example, farmland that is managed appropriately can provide 
wildlife habitat benefits that might not be available if the land 
is left idle or is developed for housing or industry. Similarly, 
farmland can provide scenic vistas of pastoral scenes that are 
enjoyed by residents of local towns and others traveling along 
nearby roads and highways. Farmland also generates watershed 
protection benefits and may be useful in protecting productive 
soil resources for future generations . These benefits are 
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considered external to agricultural production decisions because they accrue to society, at large, rather than to individual farmers. Empirical estimates of amenity values from farmland support the conceptual notion of external benefits (Bergstrom et al., 1985, Kline and Wichelns, 19961 Readyet al., 1997). 
Figure 4 depicts a situation in which the social incremental benefits of farmland lie above the private incremental benefits. The two curves are separated by a vertical distance that describes the external incremental benefits. When this occurs, the socially optimal area of land in agriculture, LS' will be greater than the farm-level profit-maximizing area, LF• Public policies that increase the farm-level benefits from farming or reduce the costs of keeping land in production may be appropriate to encourage farmers to cultivate additional land, increasing the area in 
production from LF to LS' 
Public policies that encourage the retention of agricultural land include special tax assessment programs that enable farmers to pay taxes according to farm values, rather than values that reflect development potential. Farmers are required to keep their land in agriculture for a specified number of years, in exchange for the reduced tax assessment (Aiken, 1989). Many states and some local governments also purchase the development rights to farmland, so that farmers may benefit financially from development values, while keeping their land in agriculture. These programs are often funded by bond issues that are approved in statewide referenda, reflecting public support for agricultural land preservation programs (Kline and Wichelns, 1994). Such support is also strong in Europe, where public appreciation of agriculture's role in generating and maintaining rural landscapes has led to the use of management agreements and covenants with farmers for the purpose of preserving rural landscapes (Whittaker, et al., 1991). 
The conceptual framework described in Figures 3 and 4 depicts a situation in which some of the variable inputs used in irrigated agriculture may generate negative externalities, while the land in production may generate positive external benefits. The social net benefits of agricultural production can likely be enhanced by designing public policies that address these issues, provided that the policies recognize the sources of external costs and benefits. For example, policies intended to reduce the external costs of selected variable inputs will be more efficient if they are designed to address the use of those variable inputs, directly, with minimal impact on the use of complementary inputs that may generate external benefits. The potential social gains and losses of policy alternatives are demonstrated by using this conceptual framework to examine irrigation and drainage issues in 
California's San Joaquin Valley. 
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AN IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE EXAMPLE 
Much of the subsurface drain water collected beneath farmland on 
the west side of California's San Joaquin Valley contains 
selenium, boron, and other elements that occur naturally in local 
soils and are leached from the profile during irrigation and 
drainage activities (Letey et al., 1986, Deverel and Gallanthine, 
1988, Gilliom, 1991). The u.s. Environmental Protection Agency 
has established a national water quality criterion for selenium of 
5 parts per billion (ppb), when measured as a 5-day moving average 
concentration. Selenium concentrations in farm-level drainage 
systems vary geographically within the region, ranging from less 
than 10 ppb to 4,000 ppb (Deverel et al., 1984). Drain water 
concentrations at individual drainage systems are relatively 
consistent, over time, and are correlated with drain water 
salinity (Deverel, et al., 1989). 
The California Regional Water Quality Control Board for the 
Central Valley Region has adopted a Basin Plan Amendment designed 
to achieve the national selenium concentration standard, over 
time. That amendment includes a set of monthly and annual 
selenium load targets that are expected to generate acceptable 
selenium concentrations in the near term, while farm-level and 
regional efforts are implemented, over time, to achieve the 
national water quality standard. 
The Regional Water Quality Control Board has also established a 
2-ppb selenium water quality objective for sloughs and ditches in 
a wetland habitat located between an agricultural production area 
and the San Joaquin River. As a result, it became necessary to 
remove agricultural drainage water from wetland channels, as 
selenium concentrations in drainage water are often in the range 
of 20 to 100 ppb (Deverel et al., 1984; Presser and Barnes, 1985). 
Seven irrigation and drainage districts in the region have formed 
a regional drainage authority to construct and operate drainage 
facilities, and to coordinate efforts to achieve the selenium load 
targets. The group has constructed a new channel that carries 
drainage water from all seven districts around the wetland area to 
an existing portion of the San Luis Drain, which carries the water 
to a tributary of the San Joaquin River. This program, which is 
known locally as the Grassland Bypass Project, began operating in 
september of 1996. 
The monthly and annual selenium load targets are substantially 
lower than estimates of historical discharges. As a result, 
farmers and districts have had to implement aggressive programs to 
motivate farm-level improvements in irrigation practices that will 
reduce surface runoff and deep percolation, and to increase the 
blending and re-use of drainage water with fresh water supplies. 
Innovations in district policies have included tiered water 
pricing, low-interest loans for purchasing new irrigation systems, 
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and restrictions regarding surface runoff discharged into drainage 
ditches. Farmers have responded by replacing traditional surface 
irrigation methods with improved furrow methods, gated pipe, and 
sprinkler systems. They have also increased the labor and 
management components of irrigation activities. 
District efforts to motivate farm-level improvements in water 
management are consistent with the incremental cost and benefit 
framework shown in Figure 3. charging higher prices for irrigation 
water raises the incremental cost curve, motivating farmers to 
reduce water deliveries from the original WF' in the direction of 
WS. Policies that restrict farm-level surface runoff or drain 
water volume will also raise the incremental cost curve, as 
farmers must recycle their drainage water or improve water 
management to reduce the volume of drainage water generated. 
These activities raise the implicit cost of water deliveries, even 
if the explicit price of irrigation water remains the same. 
The average volume of water delivered per hectare in the drainage 
problem area has declined as a result of farm-level and district 
efforts to reduce drain water volume and selenium loads (Wichelns 
and cone, 1992a and 1992b; Wichelns, et al., 1996). However, 
despite these efforts and the observed reductions in water 
deliveries, drain water volumes and selenium loads have not been 
reduced proportionally. It appears that exogenous forces 
including rainfall and subsurface flows of shallow groundwater 
into the drainage problem area may contribute significantly to the 
volume of drain water collected in local drainage systems. As a 
result, selenium load targets have been exceeded in many months 
since the Grassland Bypass Project was started. However, negative 
impacts of selenium concentrations in excess of water quality 
objectives have not yet been observed. 
THE ROLE OF UNCERTAINTY IN POLICY CHOICES 
Efforts to reduce water deliveries from the farm-level optimum, 
WF' to the social optimum, Ws (Figure 3), have increased the costs 
of farm-level and district water management. These costs may be 
justified, from an aggregate efficiency perspective, if the social 
optimum is, indeed, WS. However, if scientific information 
regarding the potential impacts of selenium on aquatic wildlife in 
the Grassland Area and the San Joaquin River is not yet complete, 
public officials may not know with certainty the true effects of 
selenium in those environments. As a result, the selenium load 
targets may not be truly optimal, and the costs involved in 
reducing drain water volume and selenium loads to achieve those 
targets may represent a social loss. 
conceptually, when the potential environmental effects of a 
constituent are uncertain, the expected incremental costs of an 
activity that generates that constituent or discharges it into the 
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environment will diverge from the true incremental costs. For 
example, if the potential effects of selenium are over-estimated, 
the ~ social incremental costs of water deliveries will be less 
than the expected social incremental costs (Figure 5). Regulations 
or voluntary efforts that reduce water deliveries from WF to Wse 
will generate social costs in the form of unnecessary expenditures 
on water management and reductions in output values. The size of 
the social loss is a function of the relative slopes of the 
incremental cost and benefit curves. The net social loss in 
Figure 5 is shown as the shaded area below the incremental benefit 
curve and above the true social incremental cost curve. 
social losses can also be imposed by policies directed toward 
inputs not directly responsible for generating an externality. 
For example, there is much discussion in the San Joaquin Valley 
regarding land retirement as a policy alternative for reduCing 
drain water volume and selenium loads. Several state and federal 
agencies have allocated either staff time or program funds in 
recent years to encourage farmers to retire farmland. The premise 
motivating this effort is that a smaller volume of subsurface 
drain water will be generated in the region if a smaller land area 
is farmed. Unfortunately, the physical relationships that 
generate drain water volume are not yet understood sufficiently to 
predict with accuracy the potential reductions in drain water 
volume and selenium loads that might be accomplished by land 
retirement. 
A land retirement program may generate social losses if it is not 
successful in reducing drain water volume and selenium loads, or 
if the environmental effects of selenium are less costly than 
expected. As shown in Figure 6, the socially optimal area in 
production, LS' exceeds the area chosen by farmers, LF, in cases 
where the public derives external benefits from farmland. A land 
retirement program that reduces the land in production to a land 
area such as LR will generate a net social loss described by the 
shaded area in Figure 6. That area represents the potential net 
social benefits that could be gained by expanding the land area in 
production from LR to LS. The direct costs of implementing a land 
retirement program, such as the funds required to purchase land 
and to administer the program, would increase the net social loss. 
SUMMARY 
Public policies may be appropriate for motivating farmers to 
modify their profit-maximizing decisions regarding the use of 
fixed or variable inputs when those decisions generate external 
costs or benefits. Classic examples of agricultural externalities 
include the use of fertilizer and pesticides that can reduce water 
quality in streams and aquifers. The generation of subsurface 
drain water may also involve an externality if chemicals or 
naturally occurring constituents in the drain water degrade 
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wildlife habitat in receiving areas. Positive externalities from 
agriculture include the provision of wildlife habitat, scenic 
views, and watershed protection in areas that might be developed 
for other purposes. 
The conceptual framework presented in this paper can be used by 
public officials to analyze the potential social gains and losses 
of policies designed to achieve socially optimal levels of 
agricultural activities. Appropriate policy alternatives and 
parameter values can be determined by comparing incremental cost 
and benefit information from both the farm-level and social 
perspectives. This task is particularly important when 
information regarding the incremental costs and benefits of 
agricultural activities is uncertain or incomplete, as some policy 
alternatives will be more effective than others in maximizing the 
likelihood that social goals will be achieved in those situations. 
Viewed from another perspective, the social losses that may result 
from policy implementation when incremental costs and benefits are 
uncertain will vary among policy alternatives. 
The usefulness of this conceptual framework has been demonstrated 
by examining policy alternatives for reducing drain water volume 
and selenium loads on the west side of California's San Joaquin 
Valley. Policies deSigned to reduce water use by modifying the 
price of irrigation water may be appropriate in situations where 
excessive deep percolation generates incremental external costs in 
excess of incremental benefits. However, policies to reduce the 
area of land in production may generate social losses in the form 
of reduced output and reductions in the environmental amenities 
provided by agricultural land. The likelihood that land 
retirement will generate social losses is enhanced by the lack of 
information regarding the effects of such a program on drain water 
volume and selenium loads, and uncertainty regarding the impact of 
selenium on receiving waters in the region. 
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